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In a 2x2x2 factorial design, 3rd year Romanian psychology
students (N=94) were assigned into 2 groups according to the extent to
which they acknowledged an epistemic dependence (low vs. high)
toward their professor. They then compared the competence of 3rd year
students to that of 1st year or 5th year students. Finally, they were
exposed to a persuasive counter-attitudinal message from an epistemic
authority, framed in an authoritarian vs. democratic style. The main
dependent variable was the influence of the counter-attitudinal
message. Results show an interaction between the three variables. No
effects were found among students in the upward social comparison
condition in which they felt particularly incompetent. The expected
interaction between style and dependence was significant in the
downward comparison condition where participants felt more
competent than 1st year students. Students high in perceived epistemic
dependence were more influenced by the authoritarian style than those
low in epistemic dependence. The reverse tended to be true for
participants exposed to the democratic style.
Is learning achieved to a superior level as a result of interactions with a democratic
teacher rather than an authoritarian teacher (Lewin, Lippitt, & White, 1939), as one generally
believes in Western, democratic society? In reality, the superiority of learning from
democratic instructors depends on different factors. In a study conducted with 1st year
psychology students (Mugny, Quiamzade, Pigière, Dragulescu, & Buchs, 2002), participants
first indicated whether they considered themselves more or less competent for predicting the
results of a bogus study on the importance of avoiding a hierarchy among individuals in a
group of friends. They were then confronted with an epistemic authority (a university
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professor) who contradicted this initial belief based on bogus scientific evidence demonstrating
a positive relationship between group members’ satisfaction and the degree of leadership in
the group. The results revealed an interaction between the communication style of the authority
(democratic vs. authoritarian) and the participants’ perceived competence to predict influence
of the epistemic authority. Participants who considered themselves as highly competent were
more influenced when confronted with a democratic source than when confronted with an
authoritarian source, while low self-competence participants did not clearly differ as a
function of the style of epistemic authority. Another study using the same paradigm
(Quiamzade, Mugny, Dragulescu, & Buchs, 2003) considered the students’ year of study.
Compared to a group of 1st year students, a group of 4th year students described themselves
as more competent. The source’s style (authoritarian vs. democratic) was manipulated as in
the previous study. The results highlighted a significant interaction between the style and the
year of study. The first year students were more likely to change their initial belief when
confronted with an authoritarian style rather than a democratic style. However, the reverse for
the 4th year students did not reach significance. Thus, in certain circumstances, such as when
students are reassured of their competence, they benefit more from a democratic style,
whereas in other circumstances, they benefit more from an authoritarian style. The present
study asserts the hypothesis that the strength of one style over the other depends on the degree
of informational dependence that the target experiences in relation to the source of influence
(Deutsch & Gerard, 1955).
Indeed, two studies (Mugny, Chatard, & Quiamzade, 2006) revealed that the influence of
a democratic style (rather than authoritarian style) appeared among students who judged
themselves to be independent from their professors (epistemic independence). Because these
students refused the idea that competence can be assessed via their dependence toward their
teachers, the authoritarian style threatened the target’s perceived self-competence, in a context
that is highly diagnostic of competence (Mugny, Quiamzade, Falomir, & Tafani, 2006), and
did not influence these target’s initial beliefs. The democratic style, on the contrary, relieved
this threat. This difference in the appropriation of information was not observed in students
who perceived themselves to be dependent on the epistemic authority (epistemic dependence).
Another study (Mugny, Quiamzade, & Trandafir, 2006) demonstrated that an authoritarian
style induced more influence than a democratic style when students were in a state of
epistemic dependence toward the source (i.e., students accepted the idea that their competence
was measured by their appropriation of information presented by their professors). When in a
state of epistemic dependence, the targets are motivated to elaborate the message of the
competent source who guides them towards the knowledge to acquire. In this study, a
democratic style even seemed to possess inhibitory properties that compromised the
appropriation of the message among students placed in a state of epistemic dependence. In
summary, students’ epistemic dependence tends to favour an authoritarian style while
independence tends to favour a democratic style.
The current study aims to investigate further the effects of perceived epistemic
dependence. The main hypothesis is that greater influence from an authoritarian style (vs. a
democratic style) will be observed among students high in epistemic dependence, and that the
reverse effect will be observed for those low in epistemic dependence. A more precise
hypothesis was tested regarding the threat represented by the influence of the source on the
target. In fact, the superior influence of the authoritarian style found in the study by Mugny,
Quiamzade and Trandafir (2006) was related to the fact the perceived dependence allowed the
source to be interpreted as non-threatening in spite of its authoritarian style. The transmission
of knowledge was likely achieved because the subject trusted the source (cf. McGinnies &
Ward, 1980), and because a learning relationship was created in which a didactic contract was
established (cf. Schubauer-Leoni, 1989) that assigned distinct roles to the target and the source
(i.e., the source provided the knowledge and the target acquired the knowledge). In fact,
correlational analyses indicated that the source’s authoritarian style induced more influence
when the scientific credentials of the source were recognized and when students perceived the
academic investment to be lengthier to attain the same level of expertise as the source. The
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notion of epistemic distance (cf. Ellis & Kruglanski, 1992), which concerns the gap perceived
between one’s knowledge and the knowledge to be acquired, is relevant here. The epistemic
distance did not threaten the identity of the students since the more they were influenced, the
more they perceived their own knowledge to increase in proportion to the source’s knowledge.
Furthermore, the influence was even more marked when the students believed that they had
found more correct solutions to the previous task and were more confident of their answers.
This means that in spite of the epistemic gap that separated the students from the expert
source, they did not feel totally incompetent, which allowed for some degree of learning.
To create a context where epistemic distance introduces a threat or non-threat for self-
competence, we used social comparisons between student cohorts. The comparison task made
the students feel either very competent (downward comparison; cf. Hakmiller, 1966) or very
incompetent (upward comparison). In fact, social comparisons have been shown to produce
perceptions of self-competence that were low when comparing to a superior group, and high
when comparing to an inferior group (e.g., Martin, Suls, & Wheeler, 2002). Consequently,
sources that are more competent than the target, including those that are preferred targets for
social comparison (Blanton, Buunk, Gibbons, & Kuyper, 1999; Wheeler, 1966), can represent
a threat to the target’s self-esteem (Major, Testa, & Bylsma, 1991; Morse & Gergen, 1970).
This threat is produced because the superior competence of the source renders the target’s
subjective feeling of incompetence salient. It should be noted that upward comparison is even
more problematic when comparing to individuals similar to oneself (Lockwood & Kunda,
1997; cf. Tesser, 1988). This is relevant in the present study where students have to compare
themselves to other students. An unfavourable comparison may provoke the individual to
disengage him- or herself from the task (cf. Marsh & Hau, 2003) which in terms of influence
suggests a confirmation of initial beliefs. 
On the contrary, perceiving oneself as better than others guarantees the feeling of
competence and maintains high self-esteem (Brown, 1986; Wills, 1981). Individuals who are
motivated to maintain their high self-esteem often do so by actively performing downward
comparisons (e.g., Gibbons & McCoy, 1991), especially when an acute threat to self-esteem is
present (Wood, Giordano-Beech, & Ducharme, 1999). Downward comparisons reassure
individuals of their competence, or at least minimize the threat. Indeed, influence dynamics
were previously shown to give an advantage to the authoritarian style (over the democratic
style) when the context did not represent an affront to the self-competence of students in a
state of epistemic dependence. In an effort to replicate these findings, downward social
comparisons were induced. In addition, the democratic style should be more influential on
students who are less likely to recognize their informational dependence. However, the
perception of a large epistemic gap between the source and the target (i.e., extremely low self-
competence perceived as a result of upward comparison) should hinder these influence
dynamics. 
Method
In a 2x2x2 plan, 3rd year undergraduate psychology students were identified according to
their level (low vs. high) of epistemic dependence (i.e., the extent to which they recognized an
epistemic dependence toward their professors). They were then asked to compare the
competence level of their cohort to that of a cohort of 1st year students (downward
comparison) or a cohort of 5th year students (upward comparison). Finally, they were given a
message from an epistemic authority (in an authoritarian or democratic style) contradicting
their representation of an ideal friendship group.
Participants
One hundred-two 3rd year psychology undergraduates from a Romanian university
participated in the study. Eight participants were excluded: 3 because they did not respond to
the social comparison task, 4 because they did not complete this task following the
instructions, and 1 who did not complete the influence measure. The remaining sample
consisted of 80 women and 14 men1 with a median age of 22 years.
Pretest
In order to gather data on the participants’ initial representation of an ideal friendship
group, they answered a general question asking whether or not it is necessary to have a leader
in a group of friends (1 ‘necessary to have a leader’; 4 ‘not necessary to have a leader’). The
participants then answered demographic questions regarding sex, age, country of origin and
year of study. 
Prediction task
The participants were asked to read a brief description of a fictitious study on satisfaction
and leadership in friendship groups (a full description of the procedure can be found in
Mugny, Moliner, & Flament, 1997). The description related to a longitudinal study on groups
of adolescents and young adults that investigated the relationship between individuals’
satisfaction for belonging to a group of friends and the frequency of leadership behaviours in
the group. Based on observations of the groups in which the degree of leadership varied from
10% to 80% (by intervals of 10%), eight averages of satisfaction (on a scale from 1 ‘very
weak’ to 11 ‘very strong’) were presented, some reflecting a moderate level of satisfaction
(7.5, 7.6., 7.7 and 7.9) and others a greater level (9.5, 9.6, 9.8 and 9.9). The participants’ task
was to describe the relationship between the degree of satisfaction observed in the groups of
friends and the degree of leadership in these groups. 
Acknowledgement of informational dependence 
Among a series of questions related to the participants’ representation of knowledge
(which will not be considered here), one question dealt with the influence of epistemic
authority in the university (cf. Guimond, 2001). The participants responded to the question,
“What proportion of your current knowledge in psychology depends on the influence exerted
by your professors?” on a scale from 0% to 100%. Two groups were created in which 41
participants who expressed a lesser degree of epistemic dependence (low epistemic
dependence; scores equal to or below 50, M=31.88, SD=14.58) were separated from 53
participants who expressed a higher degree of epistemic dependence (high epistemic
dependence; scores above 50, M=75.85, SD=12.35). To verify this distinction, participants
were asked to estimate how many years of study and professional experience (on a scale from
1 to 21 semesters) they would need to acquire the same level of knowledge as the epistemic
authority. They also estimated the percentage of their knowledge about an ideal friendship
group compared to the professor’s knowledge about an ideal friendship group. 
Induction of social comparaison 
The participants were then asked to compare the students from their own cohort (3rd
year) to the 1st year students (downward comparison) or the 5th year students (upward
comparison). In order to ascertain that the upward and downward comparisons were fully
established, a negative interdependence comparison (cf. Quiamzade, Mugny, & Buchs, 2005)
was kept constant. Thus, the participants had to divide 100 points between the two groups
(own group against target group) according to four criteria: competence, qualification,
capability, and expertise. Three participants whose points did not total 100 were excluded
from further analysis. 
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Message style
During the influence phase, the participants were presented the fictitious study results and
were told that the study was published in a renowned scientific journal by a research professor
who was supposedly well-regarded in his field. The research professor was in fact an
epistemic authority because of his expert status and highly-regarded competence. The results
were presented as a histogram that clearly demonstrated the relationship between the
satisfaction in belonging to a friendship group and the average rate of leadership. This
relationship was contrary to what was actually observed in the participants’ pre-test answers
and predictions (see below). Presenting the source’s conclusion that “the typical ideal
friendship group is a friendship group where a leader is present” was a pretext for inducing the
source’s style. Some participants then read the authoritarian message asserting that “Each
individual must comply with this evidence. For example, I would never allow a student to pass
who believed that an ideal friendship group does not have a leader, regardless of the
arguments provided”. In contrast, the democratic message asserted that, “Everyone needs to
make up their own mind about this evidence. For example, I would never refuse to pass a
student who believed that an ideal friendship group does not have a leader, if his/her
arguments are well developed”. As a manipulation check, the participants had to express the
degree to which these conclusions were authoritarian (4 point scale; 1 ‘not authoritarian; 4
‘authoritarian’).
Influence
Two measures of influence were used. The first concerned the participants’ agreement
with the researcher’s conclusion that an ideal friendship group must have a leader. Their
manifest agreement was assessed on an 8 point scale (1 ‘total disagreement’ to 8 ‘total
agreement’). The second measure addressed a deeper change (appropriation) and concerned
the relevance of equality in the representation of an ideal friendship group (Moliner, 1988;
Quiamzade, 2003). The participants received a short text describing a group of friends who
were satisfied in their group but who were characterized according to a functional hierarchy.
On a 4 point scale from 1 ‘very probably yes’ to 4 ‘very probably no’, they assessed the
degree to which this group was an ideal friendship group. This measure captures changes in
the structure of the representation of the friendship group. A transformation of the dominant
representation is observed when the participant believes a group of friends may be considered
as an ideal friendship group even in the presence of leadership. 
Results
The principal analysis used was an ANOVA performed according to a 2 (authoritarian vs.
democratic style) x 2 (upward vs. downward comparison) x 2 (low vs. high recognition of
epistemic dependence) design. The variations in degrees of freedom are due to missing data.
Manipulation check 
Initial representation of an ideal friendship group
Regarding the question of whether or not a friendship group should have a leader, more
than 78% of participants gave the answers 3 or 4, thereby rejecting the notion that an ideal
friendship group is based on a hierarchy (Moliner, 1988). The average degree of satisfaction
attributed to members of friendship groups were calculated for the 4 less hierarchical groups and
the 4 more hierarchical groups. The less hierarchical groups were judged to be more satisfied
(M=9.07, SD=.83) than the more hierarchical groups (M=8.23, SD=.84), t(90)=4.48, p<.001.
Recognition of informational dependence
The participants were divided into 2 groups according to whether or not they
acknowledged their epistemic dependence toward their professors (see the Method section).
Regarding the question concerning the length of study and experience necessary to attain the
same level of knowledge as the epistemic authority (from 1 to 21 semesters), we observed a
main effect for epistemic dependence: participants who acknowledged an informational
dependence stated that it would take them more time (M=11.81, SD=4.94) than those who did
not acknowledge an informational dependence, (M=9.60, SD=5.11), F(1,84)=4.31, p<.05. As
for the participants’ knowledge about an ideal friendship group (in percentage) compared to
the knowledge of the research professor, we found a similar effect: participants who
acknowledged an informational dependence asserted that they were less knowledgeable
(M=23.11, SD=16.53) than those who did not acknowledge an informational dependence
(M=31.28; SD=16.33), F(1,84)=5.85, p<.02. 
Social comparison of competencies
Regarding the comparison task, we combined the responses on the 4 items (=.90). The
analysis of variance on the points given to 3rd year students yielded only one significant effect
for social comparison, F(1,86)=350.78, p<.001: participants attributed more competence to
students of their own cohort when they compared themselves to 1st year students (M=72.57,
SD=7.91) rather than when they compared themselves to 5th year students (M=36.47,
SD=10.19). Since the participants responded according to negative interdependence (the
correlation between the 2 measures was -1), the exact inverse effect was observed for the
points attributed to 1st year students (M=27.43) and 5th year students (M=63.53).
Perception of style
The analysis of variance evaluating the perception of the epistemic authority yielded a
significant effect: authoritarian style was perceived to be more authoritarian (M=3.11,
SD=.86) than the democratic style (M=2.40, SD=.85), F(1,84)=15.38, p<.001.
Dynamics of influence
Regarding the participants’ manifest agreement with the epistemic authority, we only
observed a marginal interaction between the target of comparison and the acknowledgement
of epistemic dependence, F(1,84)=3.87, p<.06. Students who compared themselves to1st year
students were more likely to accept the source’s conclusions when they acknowledged their
epistemic dependence (M=5.35) than when they did not acknowledge it (M=4.05), t(84)=2.216,
p<.03. This difference was not observed when they compared themselves to 5th year students
(M=4.52 and M=4.89, respectively). 
Table 1
Means of appropriation (N and standard deviation in parentheses); low scores indicate more
influence
Comparison Downward Upward
Perceived epistemic dependence Low High Low High
Authoritarian style 2.88 2.00 2.55 2.42
(8; .64) (15; .53) (11; .93) (12; .51)
Democratic style 2.15 2.64 2.89 2.40
(13; .37) (11; .67) (9; .60) (15; .50)
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The results for the principal measure of this study, appropriation, showed a marginal
main effect of epistemic dependence acknowledgement, F(1,86)=3.12, p<.08, and a marginal
interaction between acknowledgement and the style of the source, F(1,86)=3.71, p<.06. We
however directly decomposed the higher order interaction since it reached significance,
F(1,86)=11.41, p<.001. In line with our hypothesis, the interaction led to a distinction whereby
the students compared in terms of upward or downward comparison (see Table 1). The
interaction between the acknowledgement of epistemic dependence and the style of the source
was not significant for the participants comparing themselves to 5th year students, F(1,43)<1.
No significant differences were observed between the various conditions. However, as expected,
this interaction was significant for participants comparing themselves with 1st year students,
F(1,43)=16,81, p<.001. The decompositions show that for participants who acknowledged
epistemic dependence, the authoritarian style was more influential than the democratic style,
t(86)=2.660, p<.01, whereas for those who did not acknowledge dependence, the democratic
style was more influential, t(86)=2.663, p<.01. Furthermore, among the participants who
compared themselves to 1st year students, it was those who acknowledged epistemic
dependence (vs. those who did not) who were more influenced by authoritarian style,
t(86)=3.316, p<.001. A marginal trend in the opposite direction was observed among
participants exposed to the democratic style, t(86)=1.954, p<.06. 
Complementary analyses 
Correlations indicated that manifest influence was generally associated with appropriation,
r(92)=-.37, p<.001 (the scales are inverted for these two measures). However, a more detailed
analysis showed that this correlation was only significant when confronted with an authoritarian
style, r(44)=-.62, p<.001 (democratic style: r(48)=-.09, n.s.; difference between correlations:
Z=-2.94, p<.01). 
Furthermore, we found that for participants comparing themselves to 1st year students,
the correlation between their agreement with the source and the degree to which they
perceived their cohort to be competent was positive and marginally significant, r(47)=.28,
p<.06, which indicated that the more they considered their cohort competent, the more they
expressed agreement. For participants comparing themselves to 5th year students, the
correlation was marginally significant and negative, r(47)=-.25, p<.10 (difference between
correlations: Z=2.54, p<.01), which showed that the more they considered their cohort
competent, the less they tended to express agreement.
Finally, with regards to the relationship between competence and appropriation for
participants comparing themselves to 1st year students, we found that appropriation was the
more pronounced when they perceived their cohort to be competent, r(47)=-33, p<.03. This
was not the case for participants who compared themselves to 5th year students, r(47)=-.02, n.s.
However, the difference between the two correlations was not significant (Z=1.51, p<.13).
Discussion
The participants’ responses concerning their initial representation of an ideal friendship
group demonstrated the importance of their beliefs about the absence of leadership. As a
consequence, the information originating from the epistemic authority clearly contradicted
their initial beliefs. The comparison task revealed expected effects: participants attributed
more competence to students of their own cohort when they compared themselves to 1st year
students rather than to 5th year students. Thus, as expected, the experimental induction
rendered the perception of competence or incompetence salient, in a context in which
participants felt inferior when they have to compare themselves to a source of superior
competence (cf. Tafani, Mugny, & Bellon, 1999). It seems therefore that downward
comparison reduced the threat which stems from the epistemic gap separating the student from
the epistemic authority, although other measures of perceived threat will be necessary in
future research. Further analyses showed that only participants performing downward
comparisons to 1st year students were more likely to consider themselves competent in spite
of the epistemic distance that separated them from the source (whose superiority was rendered
less salient), and to agree with the source and appropriate its contradictory information.
Results concerning the participants’ manifest agreement with the epistemic authority
revealed that students comparing themselves to 1st year students accepted the conclusions of
the source to a greater degree if they acknowledged their epistemic dependence than when
they did not. This difference, however, was not apparent when they compared themselves to
5th year students. We previously observed that participants who considered themselves more
competent expressed their agreement with the source’s conclusions to a greater degree
(Mugny et al., 2002) which implies that in this paradigm of learning and development, feeling
competent may involve a motivation to be influenced by a competent expert source. The same
paradigm has also revealed that participants who previously received positive feedback were
more likely to agree with a competent (rather than an incompetent) source. This dynamic was
not, however, observed in subjects identified as mediocre (Tomei & Mugny, 2003).
Regarding the appropriation measure, the higher order interaction was significant. No
effects were significant among participants comparing themselves to 5th year students.
Therefore, it seems that upward comparison, which forces subjects to acknowledge their
incompetence, did not induce any particular influence dynamics. This absence of influence
may be explained by a feeling of helplessness (cf. Seligman, 1975) which may arise from an
unfavourable comparison. Future studies should investigate this hypothesis since our analysis
was not able to adequately explore it. On the contrary, we observed a significant interaction
between the acknowledgement of informational dependence and the style of epistemic authority
in participants who compared themselves to 1st year students. In line with our predictions, the
authoritarian style (which, along with the democratic style, was clearly recognized as such)
was more influential in participants who acknowledged dependence, whereas the democratic
style was more influential in participants who did not acknowledge dependence. However, the
most robust result revealed that participants who acknowledged epistemic dependence were
more influenced by an authoritarian style than those who did not acknowledge dependence,
and that the opposite dynamic (i.e., when the participants were confronted with a democratic
style) approached significance.
In conclusion, it would seem that in the transmission of knowledge between professors
and students, the influence of epistemic authority depends on the characteristics of the target
(perception of competence and informational dependence), as well as the characteristics of the
source (influence style). In fact, no one style can be considered to have a greater impact than the
other. The democratic style can be more persuasive, but only when directed to individuals who
recognize a low degree of informational dependence to the epistemic authority. The authoritarian
style may also be influential but only when directed to individuals who acknowledge a high
degree of dependence. Finally, these dynamics are only observed in a context that attenuates the
threat induced by the epistemic gap between the self and the authority.
Notes
1 Precautionary analyses demonstrated that the participants’ gender had no effect on the results. For this reason,
gender was not taken under consideration in the analyses presented here.
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Dans un plan 2x2x2, 94 participants roumains de 3ème année
d’études en psychologie ont d’abord été distingués selon le degré (bas
ou haut) de reconnaissance de leur dépendance épistémique à l’égard
des enseignants. Ils ont ensuite eu à comparer la compétence des
étudiants de leur année d’étude à celle des étudiants de 1ère année ou
de 5ème année. Ils ont finalement été exposés à un message persuasif
contre-attitudinal provenant d’une autorité épistémique faisant usage
d’un style soit autoritaire, soit démocratique. La principale mesure
dépendante concernait l’influence du message contre-attitudinal, i.e.,
son appropriation. Les résultats donnent lieu à une interaction des trois
variables considérées. Aucune dynamique particulière n’apparaît chez
les étudiants qui ont dû effectuer une comparaison par le haut, et qui se
sont sentis très incompétents comparativement aux étudiants de 5ème
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tend à se produire face au style démocratique.
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